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Abstract: 
Third-party-instigated aggression was examined by manipulating the provocativeness of the 
same or a new target in Part 2 of a task. Effects of previous experience with aggression (i.e., 
interacting with partners supportive of or disapproving of aggression in Part 1) were also 
examined. Although the provocativeness of the target accounted for the most variance in the 
amount of aggression expressed, when the target in Part 2 was new, prior experience influenced 
aggression. Results are discussed in terms of an interactional model of behavior. The clearer the 
current situational demands (i.e., known, predictable target) were, the less the influence of past 
aggressive experience on continued aggression; the more ambiguous the current situation (i.e., 
new, unpredictable target) was, the more the influence of past aggressive experience on 
continued aggression. 
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Article:  
Although aggressive interactions are typically depicted as involving victims (targets) and 
attackers (instigators), many situations involving an aggressive encounter are situationally more 
complex. One factor that often contributes to the complexity of the situation is the presence of 
others (Borden, 1975). In the context of an aggressive exchange, observers are not always 
neutral. They may prefer one party to be victorious over the other. They may also directly or 
indirectly contribute to the outcome by playing the role of an advisor or a legitimizing source for 
the aggressive action (Gaebelein, 1973; Richardson, Bernstein, & Taylor, 1979).  
Sometimes the course of a confrontation changes, and third parties to the aggressive exchange 
take the role of a combative participant. For example, a third-party instigator, defined as one who 
directs or initiates an aggressive exchange between two others but does not get involved in the 
actual altercation (Gaebelein, 1973), may later find him- or herself face-to-face with the victim 
(target) or may encounter a new target shortly after the initial aggressive situation. When this 
change in role from passive to active participant occurs, how does the third party act? Is he or 
she more, less, or as aggressive toward an opponent now that he or she is in a position to inflict 
direct aggression? 
As an analog to the transition from indirect to direct participant in an aggressive exchange, 
Mander and Gaebelein (1977) created third-party involvement by having subjects initially 
assume the role of an advisor to one of two participants (actually a confederate) competing in a 
reaction time task. Aggressive action was introduced in the form of suggesting which intensity of 
electric shock should be delivered to the subject's partner's opponent should the opponent lose 
the trial. In a later session, subjects became active participants in the same competitive task. 
Research with this paradigm suggests that subjects tend to be influenced by the context of their 
interaction with their partners in the initial aggressive exchange.  
Mander and Gaebelein (1977) reported that subjects who had interacted with a pacifist partner 
(i.e., one who refused to set high shocks) subsequently showed a marked increase in the amount 
of aggression directed toward the same provocative target when given the opportunity. These 
authors con eluded that although the subjects had temporarily suppressed the amount of 
aggression directed toward the target (i.e., suggested that only low-shock intensities be set) due 
to the subordinate's social pressure to be nonaggressive, there did not appear to be any adoption 
of a pacifist norm on the part of the advisors. Gaebelein (1978) later demonstrated that the 
subsequent expression of aggression in the Mander and Gaebelein study probably was not a 
result of merely a frustration of the aggressive drive. She found that subjects with 
noncooperative subordinates did not aggress excessively against a new, nonprovocative target 
when given the opportunity. She went on to conclude that the  
advisors do not vent their frustration or anger aroused by a disobedient subordinate 
against an innocent victim; apparently, when the target of an advisor remains the same, 
aggression increases when the social pressure is removed, but when the target is a new 
person, undeserving of attack, the pacificism seems to generalize, (p. 303) 
These studies, in line with a cognitive social learning perspective, suggest that the nature of the 
past experience with instigative aggression should interact with the perception of the opponent's 
behavior to affect aggressive behavior. That is, based on past experience with the situation, cues 
that encourage or elicit aggressive behavior will be more salient and hence more likely to have a 
mediating effect on the instigation of aggression. In Rotter's (1954) terms, subjects would have 
developed a generalized expectancy for aggression. However, rather than predict a simple linear 
increase in aggressive behavior as a function of recent past experience as a target or observer of 
aggressive action (see Taylor, Shuntich, & Greenberg, 1979), situational or contextual cues are 
likely to mediate and predict aggressive behavior. In Rotter's terms, a specific expectancy would 
also exist.   
Thus, the purpose of the present study was to examine the influence of past aggressive 
experience on subsequent aggressive behavior. Subjects were involved initially in a reaction time 
task as advisors to partners who were either supportive (i.e., a cooperative partner who tacitly 
approved of aggression) or critical (i.e., a partner who explicitly disapproved of aggression) of 
using aggressive counterresponses (bogus electric shocks). Subjects were later placed in a 
situation in which they could make direct aggressive responses. The consequences of either the 
initial positive or negative experience with aggression for different types of victims (familiar or 
unfamiliar, provocative or nonprovocative) were also examined. Hence, the interaction of a 
generalized expectancy (i.e., past experience) with a specific expectancy (i.e., current situation) 
could be examined.  
In Gaebelein (1978) a new, nonprovocative target did not "suffer" because her attacker had had a 
prior positive experience with aggression, whereas in the Mander and Gaebelein (1977) study the 
aggression directed toward a same, provocative target was influenced by the attacker's prior 
experience. However, the aggression-eliciting power of a new, provocative target relative to a 
same, nonprovocative target (who was previously provocative) has not been examined to date; 
thus, it is not clear from the data of previous studies what the relative contributions of 
provocation and familiarity with the target are to the relationships observed. Therefore, an 
additional purpose of the present study was to assess the variance accounted for by these two 
factors.  
Two types of responses were of particular interest: subjects' initial aggressive response on Trial 1 
of Part 2, and their subsequent aggressive reactions to the opponent's provocation. A behavioral 
interpretation would predict that the cooperative experience (i.e., partner endorsing aggressive 
responding) would result in more aggression for these subjects on Trial 1 of Part 2 than for 
subjects with the noncooperative partner; a social learning interpretation would not necessarily 
make such predictions. Rather, this approach would suggest that since the situation has changed, 
subjects may take a "wait and see" stance, that is, no differences on Trial 1. Regarding 
subsequent responding, a behavioral perspective would predict a strong carry-over effect due to 
past experience, that is, one would assume that generalized expectancies would take precedence 
over specific expectancies. On the other hand, the social learning perspective would argue that 
the current cues, if not ambiguous, would be stronger than the past experience, although they 
may interact with past experience. Based on previous aggression research, it was predicted that 
provocation would account for a greater proportion of the variance in the data than past 
experience and/ or type of opponent. 
Method 
Subjects 
Eighty female students volunteered from a subject pool at the University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro. Participation could serve as partial fulfillment of course requirements for 
undergraduate classes in introductory psychology. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus (described by Gaebelein, 1973) included a responder's task board equipped with 
(a) three, lights: two white lights labeled "set" and "press," respectively, and an amber light 
labeled "release;" (b) a reaction time key; (c) five red feedback lights labeled from 1 to 5, and 
one white light labeled "lose" (these lights conveyed the outcome of each experimental trial); (d) 
five shock-setting buttons numbered consecutively from 1 to 5. 
Procedure 
Two persons, the subject and a female confederate, were brought into the experimental room and 
told that they would be competing in a reaction time task with two other female subjects situated 
in another room. At this point subjects were informed that the study involved electric shock and 
were given the option to withdraw. One subject withdrew from the experiment because of an 
unwillingness to deliver shock to others. 
If the subject agreed to continue, the experimenter explained that one subject of each pair would 
be a "responder" and the other an "advisor." A drawing was held to randomly determine the role 
that each participant would play. Actually the procedure was rigged so that the real subject 
always acted as advisor and the confederate as responder. The confederate was seated in front of 
the task board, and an inoperative shock electrode was connected to the palmar side of her left 
wrist. The subject was seated adjacent to the responder; then, using a modified method of limits, 
the responder's "unpleasantness" threshold for shock was determined. The responder did not 
actually receive shock but only acted as though she did; the shock level she reported as 
"definitely unpleasant" was considered the "maximum" shock intensity that could be delivered. 
The experimental session was divided into two parts. During the first part the subject acted as an 
advisor, that is, suggested shock levels for the responder to set. During Part 2 the subject became 
more directly involved in the aggressive interaction by virtue of the Tact that she was instructed 
to set the shock buttons herself and to compete in the reaction time task, The subject was also 
told that she would not receive any shock and that her reaction time data were being collected as 
control data. 
Each trial in the task involved four events: (a) The set light flashed, at which time the subject 
suggested to the responder the shock level to set for the opponent should she lose on the coming 
trial, After the advisor suggested a shock setting, the responder pressed one of five shock 
buttons, (b) The press light flashed, at which time the responder depressed the reaction time key. 
(c) The release light flashed, and the responder removed her finger from the reaction time key as 
fast as possible, (d) One of the five feedback lights flashed, indicating which shock level the 
opponent had ostensibly set for the responder. Subjects were told that the Number 5 shock was 
equal to the shock the responder judged most unpleasant during the threshold procedure and that 
the other shocks were percentages of this. If the trial was predetermined to be a lose trial, the lose 
light flashed, and the responder feigned a shock of the intensity set by the opponent. 
Experimental Design 
The experimental design was a mixed design with cooperation, provocation, and type of 
opponent as between- subject factors, and trial blocks and win-lose as within-subject variables. 
Cooperation. Half of the subjects in the experiment were randomly paired with a cooperative 
partner and the other half with a noncooperative partner. Cooperative confederates set the 
advised shock level on each trial. Noncooperative (nonaggressive)1 confederates set the 
suggested shock levels only when the recommended settings were 1s and 2s. If the subject 
advised a shock of 3 or greater, the confederate stated, "I don't believe in shocking people" and 
set a 1 or a 2 (confederates were trained to randomly set an equal number of Is and 2s). To keep 
verbal interaction in the noncooperative groups to a minimum, the noncooperative confederates, 
when instructed by the subject (advisor) to set a shock above 2, repeated that they did not believe 
in hurting anyone and set a 1 or 2 level of shock. 
Type of opponent. During Part 2, half of the subjects were assigned to the same condition. These 
subjects were told that they would be competing against the advisor of the opponent-responder 
from Part 1. The other half of the subjects were assigned to the different condition and were told 
that an advisor who had participated in the experiment a week earlier had been asked to come 
back and would be their opponent during the second part of the experiment. 
Increasing provocation (trial blocks). This within-subjects variable was defined as the feedback 
subjects received regarding the level of shock set by the opponent. During each trial block 
(composed of six trials), the opponent's mean shock setting increased by 1 shock level during 
Part 1 of the experiment. Part 1 was composed of four trial blocks. During Trial Block 1 the 
opponent set three Number 1 shocks and three Number 2 shocks (in random order), yielding a 
mean shock level of 1.5 for Trial Block 1. The mean shock settings for Trial Blocks 2, 3, and 4 
were 2.5, 3.5, and 4.5, respectively. 
Part 2 of the experiment was composed of three trial blocks. In Part 2, half of the subjects 
continued to receive provocative feedback (opponent was setting shock levels 4 and 5) and half 
of the subjects received nonprovocative feedback (opponents set Is and 2s). 
Win-lose. Within each trial block, responders won three trials and lost three. The particular order 
of winning and losing was randomly determined. 
Results 
Figure and Table 1 are omitted from this formatted document. 
For the purpose of data analysis, three dependent variables were identified: mean shock settings 
suggested during each trial block of Part 1; actual shock level set on Trial I of Part 2; and mean 
actual shock set during each trial block of Part 2. The analysis of the mean shock suggested by 
subjects during Part 1 of the study confirmed previous results. Both cooperation, F(l, 72) = 
28.97,p < .001, [//(utility index) = 10.92%, and trial blocks, F(3, 216) = 51.74, p < .001, UI:s = 
12.99%, as well as the Cooperation X Trial Blocks interaction, F(3, 216) = 11.79, p < .001, UI = 
2.77%, were significant. At each trial block, Scheffe means comparisons revealed that subjects 
with cooperative partners suggested significantly higher shock (Ms = 2.12, 2.30, 2.83, and 3.19) 
than did subjects with noncooperative (nonaggressive) partners (Ms = 1.80, 1.84, 2.04, and 2.17). 
Furthermore, for subjects in the cooperative condition, all blocks except 1 and 2 were 
significantly different; whereas for subjects in the noncooperative condition, only Trial Block 4 
was greater than 1 and 2. These effects are evident in Part 1 of Figure 1. 
To examine the effects of the experimental manipulations in the second part of the study, two 
analyses were performed. First, an analysis of Trial 1 responses was performed. This analysis 
revealed that neither past experience with a cooperative or noncooperative partner (Ms = 1.81 
and 1.60, respectively) nor status of opponent, same or new (Ms = 1.62 and 1.79, respectively), 
produced significant differences. 
The means for Part 2 are portrayed graphically in Figure 1. The analysis of these data indicated a 
significant effect for provocation, F(l, 72) = 16.43, p < .001, UI - 12.55%. The Cooperation X 
Type of Opponent, F(l, 72) = 3.80, UI = 2.28%; Cooperation X Opponent X Trial Blocks, F(2, 
144) = 2.84, UI., = .41%; and Opponent X Provocation X Win-Lose, F(l, 72) = 2.80, UI,, = 
.22%,interactions were all significant at p < .10. Scheffe tests of means were performed on these 
interactions, with a = .05. The Cooperation X Opponent interaction was due to the cooperation 
new opponent condition (M = 2.77) eliciting more aggression than the others, which did not 
differ significantly (cooperation same, M = 2.16; noncooperation same, M - 2.23; 
noncooperation new, M = 2.03). The Cooperation X Opponent X Trial Block interaction 
revealed the following response patterns (the means are presented in Table 1): First, only the 
cooperation new condition elicited an increased level of aggression over time, with Trial Block 2 
being greater than Trial Block 1, although not different from Trial Block 3. Also, at each trial 
block the new opponent was the target of more aggression than the same opponent but only for 
subjects who had had cooperative partners; subjects with noncooperative partners did not show 
this effect. Finally, the cooperation-noncooperation effect was significant at each trial block, 
with cooperation resulting in more aggression than noncooperation for the new opponent only. 
When the opponent was the same in Part 1 and Part 2, a difference due to the cooperation-
noncooperation manipulation did not emerge. The Opponent X Provocation X Win-Lose 
interaction was evident in that after a lose trial, the new opponent received more intense shock 
(M = 3.00) than the same opponent (M = 2.49). Also, losing (M = 1.99) produced more 
aggression than winning (M = 1.80) for only the same nonprovocative opponent. 
Discussion  
Consistent with previous research, data from Part 1 of the present study showed that provocative 
targets were the object of more aggression than nonprovocative targets. Also consistent with 
previous findings, when the confederate responders (Part 1) were cooperative, subjects suggested 
increasingly greater shocks and an overall greater intensity of shock than when the confederate 
responders were noncooperative and nonaggressive (Gaebelein, 1973; Richardson et al., 1979). 
In examining the data from Part 2 (both Trial 1 responses and mean shock settings across trial 
blocks), it was quite clear that prior history alone was not sufficient to predict subsequent 
aggressive behavior. As a matter of fact, cooperation-noncooperation was not even a significant 
source of variance in Part 2 of the study, although in Part 1 of the present study and in other 
investigations of third-party instigated aggression, it has been a very powerful variable. Rather, 
the degree of aggression expressed was also modulated by the current conditions; in the present 
study the critical factor appeared to be the target. When the target was the same in Part 1 and Part 
2, whether the subjects had previously experienced cooperation or noncooperation did not 
matter. Only when the target was new did prior experience with using high or low shocks make a 
difference. This suggests that subjects who had expectations concerning both the continuing 
behavior of the same target and the likelihood that they could control the target chose shock 
intensities accordingly. If the target continued to be provocative, subjects counterattacked by 
setting high levels of shock; if the target became nonaggressive, subjects also adopted a 
nonaggressive pattern. On the other hand, subjects who could not predict or control the behavior 
of the new target, relied more heavily on their own past behavior in deciding on an appropriate 
course of action. Subjects with history of using higher shocks continued to use higher shocks; 
those who had used only the lower shocks continued with low shocks. This explanation suggests 
that the less predictable a situation, the more likely one's past behavior will predict behavior in 
the current situation. If the current situation provides clear cues concerning appropriate actions, 
then there is less likelihood that past performance will be an accurate predictor. This 
interpretation supports an interactional model of behavior that suggests that one's past history 
interacts with current situational cues in determining behavior (Endler & Magnusson, 1976) and 
influencing one's expectancies (Mischel, 1973). It also suggests that specific expectancies may 
take precedence over generalized expectancies, at least under the conditions given in the present 
study.  
A second purpose of the present study was to look at the relative contribution of the same-new 
and provocative-nonprovocative target characteristics. The results of this study strongly indicate 
that the provocativeness of the target accounted for a substantial percentage of variance in the 
data; whether the target in the subsequent situation was the same or new was relatively 
unimportant; her behavior was more important.  
In conclusion, at least two classes of explanations have been posited to explain the effects of 
prior exposure to aggression on subsequent aggressive behavior. One relies on a behavioral 
interpretation that emphasizes the role of actual behavioral rehearsal and reinforcement. For 
example, Patterson, Littman, and Bricker (1967) observed in a field study that passive children 
who successfully stopped their own victimization through counterattack were subsequently more 
aggressive than children whose counteraggression was not successful. More recently, Taylor, et 
al.'s (1979) first study showed that exposure to attack and experience with aggressive behavior 
resulted in more subsequent aggression in the experimental group than in the nonattacked control 
group.  
Another class of explanations is cognitive in nature and relies on concepts such as modeling, 
observation, and attribution (Bandura, 1973; Mischel, 1973). As Bandura noted, "Reduction of 
inhibitions does not mean that observers will attack people indiscriminately. . . . Nor does the 
appearance of aggressive behavior as a result of restraint reduction imply that a formerly bridled 
urge to attack is set free.. . . When inhibitions are reduced, behavior is more subject to 
cognitively mediated control" (p. 129). For example, Geen (1981) demonstrated that exposure to 
film violence produced a desensitization to aggression-inhibiting cues, but whether aggressive 
behavior increased or decreased depended on whether subjects regarded the violence as justified 
or nonjustified. Geen's results supported the notion that past exposure to violence interacts with 
the current context to affect aggressive responding. Other studies similarly support the idea that 
neither the present situation nor past experience alone can predict aggressive behavior. 
Information and/or expectations about potential targets are critical (Gaebelein, 1978; Gaebelein 
& Mander, 1978; O'Leary & Dengerink, 1973; Taylor et al., 1979).  
Taken together these studies form a data base from which one can argue that past  exposure to 
and/or behavioral involvement in aggression does not automatically increase the probability of 
subsequent aggression. It is more likely that the context of the current situation, that is, the 
individual's interpretation, mediates the presence and intensity of aggression. In the present study 
the cooperative partner had a disinhibitory effect on subjects' aggressive tendencies, which 
carried over to the subsequent situation when it was ambiguous (i.e., an unfamiliar opponent who 
was also provocative). The provocation provided the justification for the disinhibited aggressive 
tendency to be actualized as overt behavior. "When people respond approvingly or even 
indifferently to the actions of assailants, they convey the impression that aggression is not only 
acceptable but expected in similar situations" (Bandura, 1973, p. 129). 
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Notes 
1 The reader is asked to note that the noncooperative confederate was noncooperative only with 
regard to setting high levels of shock. If told to set a low-level shock, she cooperated.  
 
